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INSTITUTIONS IN CONTEXT 
John D. Inazu* 
PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2013). Pp. 384. Hardcover $ 
49.95.  
 
Paul Horwitz’s First Amendment Institutions is a welcome addition to First 
Amendment scholarship.1 Horwitz calls for us to take institutions and their contexts 
seriously.2 He makes a strong case for greater scholarly and judicial attention to 
institutions, and he shows us why “acontextual” First Amendment thinking and doctrine 
lead to rigid formalism and missed opportunities.3 Horwitz enhances his argument with 
five nuanced chapters on specific institutions: universities, presses, churches, libraries and 
associations.4 These chapters bring to life our diverse institutions and their differences. 
It is less clear whether the descriptive differences that Horwitz highlights warrant 
the doctrinal differences that he advocates. In other words, even if Horwitz is right to call 
our attention to institutions, do his observations translate to First Amendment doctrine that 
can meaningfully distinguish between these institutions? The doctrinal uncertainty is 
particularly noticeable when Horwitz introduces the last of his case studies: associations. 
In some ways, Horwitz’s chapter on associations blurs—and thereby renders vulnerable—
the distinctive contours that he lays out for universities, presses, churches, and libraries.5 
At the same time, the boundaries of these other case studies face internal pressures from 
the various entities that lay claim to each of them. In this sense, Horwitz’s “institution” 
calls to mind Wittgenstein’s “game” and the difficulties of definitional boundaries.6 That 
kind of fuzziness works for Wittgenstein’s thought experiment of “family resemblances,” 
but it poses a far greater challenge for a theory that plays out in legal doctrine applied to 
actual controversies.7 Or so I shall argue. 
                                                          
 * Associate Professor of Law and Political Science, Washington University. Thanks to Rick Garnett, Randy 
Kozel, and Nelson Tebbe for helpful comments on an earlier version of this review. Thanks to Mark 
Gruetzmacher for research assistance. 
 1. PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2013). 
       2.    Id. at 8-24. 
       3.    Id. at 42-67. 
       4.    Id. at 107-238. 
       5.    Id. at 211-38. 
 6. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., Basil Blackwell & 
Mott, Ltd. 3d ed. 1958) (1953). 
 7. The category of “religion” raises similar definitional difficulties. See George C. Freeman III, The 
Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of “Religion,” 71 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1564 (1983) (“Courts simply 
cannot use ‘religion’ as a term of art without converting the right to the free exercise of religion into a seemingly 
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I turn first to the pressures internal to Horwitz’s institutional categories by focusing 
on two of his core examples: universities and churches.8 I then examine Horwitz’s chapter 
on associations and suggest broader implications than he acknowledges. I conclude by 
offering a different way to parse Horwitz’s argument: embracing his institutional 
distinctiveness within the time-honored public-private distinction that he rejects. 
THE UNIVERSITY 
The university occupies a central role in Horwitz’s First Amendment landscape: 
“[u]niversities are so well established and so bound by tradition that they serve as a 
paradigmatic example of a First Amendment institution.”9 Horwitz highlights many 
unique aspects of the university: academic freedom,10 tenure,11 curricular development,12 
selective admissions,13 and student speech.14 Each of these contributes to the university’s 
“self-regulating” character, which is for Horwitz one of the key features of a First 
Amendment institution.15 But the crux of the university’s institutional distinctiveness is its 
“uniquely academic contribution to public discourse.”16 
What exactly is an “academic contribution?” And does a public discourse approach 
really improve upon our current First Amendment framework?17 Horwitz’s framing of the 
institutional distinctiveness of a university encounters both functional and definitional 
challenges. In other words, his account raises questions about what a proper university 
does and what constitutes a proper university. 
The question of what a university does suggests that some institutions that we can 
surely classify as universities will not always function as such. My alma mater, Duke 
University, may not be fulfilling its academic contribution to public discourse during 
fraternity and sorority rush, or when its men’s basketball team brings home another 
national championship.18 But Duke is still incontrovertibly a university (and presumably a 
                                                          
illimitable right of personal autonomy.”); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. 
L. REV. 753 (1984); John D. Inazu, The Freedom of the Church (New Revised Standard Version), 21 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 335, 361-64 (2013).   
 8. These selections are not arbitrary. Setting aside (for the moment) religious universities, which blend 
aspects of both institutional categories, the separate institutions of churches and universities share in common 
the advancement of contested normative and metaphysical claims about the nature of the world and the nature of 
humanity. They are for this reason among the most important institutions in our society. See, e.g., ALASDAIR 
MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY: ENCYCLOPEDIA, GENEALOGY, AND TRADITION 
216-36 (1990); STANLEY HAUERWAS, THE STATE OF THE UNIVERSITY: ACADEMIC KNOWLEDGES AND THE 
KNOWLEDGE OF GOD (2007).  
 9. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 140. 
 10. Id. at 109-10. 
 11. Id. at 122. 
 12. Id. at 123-24. 
 13. Id. at 125-26. 
 14. Id. at 126-28.   
 15. Id. at 120.   
 16. Id. at 121. 
 17. Horwitz critiques two existing First Amendment doctrines in the context of the university: state action 
and public forum. These doctrines are not without their problems, but it isn’t clear that rejecting them wholesale 
for a functionalist institutional approach clarifies or simplifies the landscape. For my consideration of the 
importance of the public forum doctrine, see John D. Inazu, The First Amendment’s Public Forum, 55 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). 
 18. On the challenges that big-time athletic programs pose for colleges and universities, see CHARLES T. 
CLOTFELTER, BIG-TIME SPORTS IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES (2011).  
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First Amendment institution, even if some of its actions are not protected under a 
heightened standard).19  
In contrast to the function of a university, the question of what constitutes a 
university suggests that some educational institutions may fall below Horwitz’s threshold 
for a “university.” In other words, not “just any institution that calls itself a university 
qualifies for the kind of legal autonomy First Amendment institutionalism prescribes.”20 
Horwitz intimates that McDonald’s “Hamburger University” is one such example.21 He 
posits “for-profit institution[s], like DeVry University or Phoenix University” as another 
“boundary” case.22 Those institutions “might offer some of the basic services that other 
universities do but without providing all of the governance structures.”23 
Horwitz argues “that simply presenting such examples suggests that these sorts of 
boundary questions will often be easier for courts to address sensibly than we might 
fear.”24 I am not so sure. Consider Horwitz’s claim that “the core of First Amendment 
institutionalism is that an institution serves a well-established function that forms part of 
the infrastructure of public discourse and that it operates as a substantially self-regulating 
institution.”25 How do universities stack up against this theoretical justification for 
institutional autonomy? Horwitz acknowledges that “not all universities are the same,”26 
but he seems not to account for the degree of diversity within the category of “university.”   
We can illustrate the difficulty posed by this diversity by sampling some of the 
institutions of higher learning in Horwitz’s own backyard.27 Begin with Horwitz’s 
employer, the University of Alabama. In addition to the law school, the state’s flagship 
university has twelve other academic divisions,28 an endowment of close to a billion 
dollars,29 and some would argue, a football team.30 Its 1,314 faculty and 3,663 staff help 
educate over 33,000 students.31 
                                                          
 19. Horwitz suggests that “[o]nly [a university’s] academic decisions will be entitled to institutional 
autonomy.” HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 121. This standard leaves open the question of who decides whether a 
decision is “academic,” and what kind of deference that decision is entitled. 
 20. Id. at 120. 
 21. Id. Hamburger University is “the ‘global center of excellence for McDonald’s operations training and 
leadership development.’” Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id.  Universities must make “a uniquely academic contribution to public discourse.” Id. at 121.   
 26. Id. at 141. 
 27. Although Horwitz never explicitly says so, I assume that his category of “university” also includes 
colleges (like Davidson College) that aren’t technically universities. The only evidence to the contrary would be 
his mention of the “nine colleges in the American colonies.” Id. at 108. However, even this is not explicit, as he 
never ties this reference directly to his contemporary use of “University.”  
 28. Academics, THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA, http://www.ua.edu/academics.html (last visited October 26, 
2014). 
 29. National Association of College and University Business Officers and Commonfund Institute, Almanac 
of Higher Education 2013: College and University Endowments, 2011-12, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION, http://chronicle.com/article/CollegeUniversity/136933 (click forward arrow under table twice) (last 
visited October 26, 2014). See also Wayne Grayson, UA System Fund Nears $977 Million in Value, TUSCALOOSA 
NEWS (May 18, 2012), http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/20120518/news/120519746?p=2&tc=pg&tc=ar.  
 30. The football team plays its home games in Bryant–Denny Stadium, which seats over 100,000 and has 
undergone over $100 million of renovations in the last two decades. See Adam Jones, UA Stadium Expansion 
Cheaper than Expected, TUSCALOOSA NEWS (Apr. 17, 2009), 
http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/20090417/NEWS/904169969.  
 31. See Dr. Yardley S. Bailey, Data Summary, UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA SYSTEM at 15, 60, & 64 (Aug. 
3
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Shelton State Community College is five miles down the road from the Crimson 
Tide. Founded in 1979,32 Shelton State is “a public open-admission comprehensive 
community college whose primary mission is to provide accessible postsecondary 
education, training, and community educational opportunities.”33 The Humanities & 
Communications Arts department offers courses in history, humanities, mass 
communications, philosophy, religion, and speech.34 The historically black two-year 
school also houses the Fire College, which is responsible for training paid and volunteer 
fire fighters and EMTs throughout the state.35 
Just over 100 miles southeast from the University of Alabama, Maxwell Air Force 
Base is home to Air University. The educational arm of the Air Force includes the Air 
Command and Staff College (offering master’s degrees and other training to mid-level 
officers), the Judge Advocate General’s School (providing instruction and continuing 
education for lawyers and paralegals), the Community College of the Air Force (offering 
two-year associates degrees), and a number of other programs. Air University employs 
hundreds of military and civilian faculty to accomplish its pedagogical objectives.36 It also 
houses Air University Press, the Air & Space Power Journal, Strategic Studies Quarterly, 
and a host of other publications.37 
Heritage Christian University lies 130 miles due north of the University of Alabama. 
The Churches of Christ school has an enrollment of eighty-eight students.38 Its primary 
focus is an undergraduate program leading to a bachelor’s degree in Biblical Studies.39 All 
students major in Bible and may choose a minor in Biblical History, Biblical Languages, 
Counseling, Family Life (Youth) Ministry, New Testament, or Old Testament.40 Every 
student is required to participate weekly in two hours of a Christian service project.41 
Is there a way to construe the institutional category of “university” that includes the 
                                                          
2013), http://uasystem.ua.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/2013-DATA-SUMMARY-BOOK-FOR-THE-WEB-
10-08-13.pdf.  
 32. Campus History: History of Shelton State Community College, SHELTON STATE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
http://www.sheltonstate.edu/discover_sscc/campus_history.aspx (last visited October 26, 2014). 
 33. Mission, Vision, & Values, SHELTON STATE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
http://www.sheltonstate.edu/discover_sscc/mission_vision_values.aspx (last visited October 26, 2014). 
 34. Humanities & Communications Arts, SHELTON STATE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
http://www.sheltonstate.edu/instruction/humanities_communications_arts.aspx (last visited October 26, 2014). 
 35. Catalog and Student Handbook: Fall 2006 - Summer 2007, SHELTON STATE COMMUNITY COLLEGE at 5, 
available at http://www.sheltonstate.edu/Uploads/files/Admissions/catalog/06-07/intro2.pdf. “The Alabama 
Fire College and Personnel Standards Commission/Shelton State Community College is responsible for training 
the thousands of paid and volunteer fire fighters, industrial fire protection personnel, rescue squad members, and 
emergency medical personnel throughout the state of Alabama . . . .” Id. 
 36. Fact Sheet, MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, 
http://www.maxwell.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=13308 (last visited October 26, 2014).  See also 
2013 Annual Report, THE AIR UNIVERSITY, 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/audocs/AU_2013_Annual_Report_Web_Version.pdf (last visited October 26, 2014). 
 37. Publications, THE AIR UNIVERSITY, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/publications.htm (last visited October 
26, 2014).   
 38. Heritage Christian University Stats, Info and Facts, CAPPEX, 
https://www.cappex.com/colleges/Heritage-Christian-University (last visited October 26, 2014). 
 39. About Us, HERITAGE CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY, http://www.hcu.edu/about (last visited October 26, 2014). 
 40. Academics, HERITAGE CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY, http://www.hcu.edu/academics/undergraduate (last 
visited October 26, 2014). 
 41. Christian Service, HERITAGE CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY, http://www.hcu.edu/service (last visited October 
26, 2014). 
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University of Alabama, Shelton State Community College, Air University, and Heritage 
Christian University, but excludes DeVry University (or at least some for-profit 
universities) and Hamburger University? If so, what is it?42 Each of these institutions has 
a “self-regulating quality” that includes internal “norms, practices, and rules.”43 Each is 
engaged in the transmission of skills and knowledge from teachers to students in a shared 
endeavor that includes college credit.44 Many of the students at Hamburger University 
complete their training online, but the University of Alabama also offers the opportunity 
to “earn your bachelor’s, master’s, or doctoral degree through flexible distance and online 
programs.”45 The faculty at DeVry University and Hamburger University may not spend 
much time on academic research, but neither do the faculty at Shelton State or Heritage 
Christian (or the football coach at the University of Alabama).46 DeVry University may be 
“for-profit,” but Air University’s existence is devoted to the United States Air Force and 
Heritage Christian follows the Good Book—none of these defining missions is self-
evidently related to “public discourse.” 
Even the modern research university—ostensibly the core example of a university—
raises serious theoretical tensions with the justifications that Horwitz offers for First 
Amendment institutions. In many cases, the immense influence of government and 
corporate dollars, the vast revenues and resources from affiliated hospitals and clinics, and 
the constant pressures of high profile athletics, take the modern research university far 
afield from the “public discourse” justification that Horwitz assigns to it. In fact, Horwitz’s 
justification faces pressure even within the activities most central to the production of 
knowledge and facilitation of discourse. As Alasdair MacIntyre noted a generation ago, 
social pressures require that universities “produce more cogent justifications for their 
continued existence and their continued privileges than they have hitherto been able to do 
out of what have suddenly been revealed as the astonishingly meagre cultural and 
intellectual resources of the academic status quo.”47 And MacIntyre’s indictment came at 
a time when the tuition at private postsecondary schools averaged $9,083, not the $24,525 
sticker price today.48 
The questions of what a university does and what constitutes a university are not 
                                                          
 42. Consider also that many of the high schools in Alabama offer advanced placement classes that qualify 
for college credit. Some of those classes are taught by highly educated teachers, and some of those teachers 
pursue academic writing and engage in other forms of public discourse.   
 43. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 87-88. 
 44. See, e.g., College Credit Connection, MCDONALDS, 
http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/mcd/corporate_careers/training_and_development/hamburger_university/coll
ege_credit_connection.html (last visited October 26, 2014) (detailing opportunity for college credit through 
Hamburger University).  
 45. See Bama By Distance, UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA, http://bamabydistance.ua.edu/ (last visited October 
26, 2014). 
 46. See, e.g., Faculty, HERITAGE CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY, http://www.hcu.edu/faculty (last visited October 
26, 2014) (“While every Bible instructor is fully credentialed with degrees from institutions such as Brite Divinity 
School, Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion, and Brandeis University, each instructor also has 
personal experience in local ministry, stateside campaigns, and foreign missions.”).  
 47. MACINTYRE, supra note 8, at 221 (emphasis in original).  
 48. Average tuition and fees at private, 4-year nonprofit and for-profit degree granting postsecondary 
institutions. See Average Undergraduate Tuition and Fees and Room and Board Rates Charged for Full-time 
Students in Degree-granting Postsecondary Institutions, by Level and Control of Institution: 1963-64 Through 
2012-13, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS,   
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d13/tables/dt13_330.10.asp. 
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easily answered in the context of today’s higher education landscape. And the ambiguities 
and tensions surrounding those questions complicate the justifications that Horwitz offers 
for treating the university as a First Amendment institution. Indeed, with respect to the 
university, Horwitz’s functionalist inquiry ultimately complicates the kind of categorical 
line-drawing on which his institutionalist approach depends.  
THE CHURCH 
The institutional category of church confronts similar difficulties. Horwitz’s chapter 
on churches opens with references to “religious entities,” “religious organizations,” 
“religious groups,” “religious functions,” and “religion”—all in the first paragraph.49 
Horwitz seems to settle on the term “religious entities” but that description is latent with 
ambiguity. Does it include a Catholic charity, a religious hospital, or Hobby Lobby?50 
What about “parachurch” ministries?51 Does it include Heritage Christian University, or a 
Lutheran elementary school?52 If not all of these, then why not, and how do we justify 
protections for some religious institutions but not others? 
Horwitz posits that there is a “strong case for treating religious entities as First 
Amendment institutions and granting them a significant degree of legal autonomy.”53 One 
might be able to derive that premise from within constitutional law.54 But Horwitz seeks a 
theoretical grounding that encompasses more than constitutional doctrine. He writes that 
“arguments about the infrastructural or institutional role of churches and other religious 
organizations have, both historically and today, been expressed in explicitly religious 
terms.”55 That is not quite right. All of the arguments that Horwitz enlists are expressed in 
explicitly theological terms, and theology requires a particularity that “religion” does 
not.56 That is one reason, as I have argued elsewhere, that religious institutionalist 
arguments grounded in the “freedom of the church” confront a translatability challenge 
that may be insurmountable.57 
This theological particularity creates a problem for Horwitz. In seeking to assuage 
readers who might find theological justifications off-putting or irrelevant, Horwitz argues 
                                                          
 49. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 174. 
 50. See Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 13-CV-2611, 2013 WL 6839900 (D. Colo. 
Dec. 27, 2013); Overall v. Ascension, 13-11396, 2014 WL 2448492 (E.D. Mich. May 13, 2014) (hospital); 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 51. See Conlon v. Intervarsity Christian Fellowship, Case No. 1:13–CV–1111, WL 1340752 (W.D. Mich. 
April 3, 2014) (applying ministerial exception to campus ministry organization and noting that “Plaintiff does 
not dispute that IVCF is a religious organization that may assert the ministerial exception”). See also MARK A. 
NOLL & CAROLYN NYSTROM, IS THE REFORMATION OVER? 85-86 (2005) (noting that “parachurch groups [are] 
only loosely connected to an ecclesiastical structure”). 
 52. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (recognizing 
ministerial exception in case involving “called teacher” at Lutheran school). 
 53. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 175. 
 54. In fact, I think that is probably the most charitable reading of the Court’s effort to distinguish Employ’t 
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), in its recent decision in Hosanna-Tabor. See Inazu, supra note 7, at 360-61 
(discussing the tensions raised that Hosanna-Tabor raises with Smith). 
 55. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 175. 
 56. Inazu, supra note 7, at 365.   
 57. Id. at 365-66. I have also questioned Horwitz’s reliance on Dutch-Calvinist theology for a more broadly 
construed theoretical argument. Id. at 342 n.21 (“Protestant theology for Horwitz is really just circumstantial, 
and the theory—at least the way that he deploys it—does not rely in any meaningful way on either the theology 
or the contemporary salience of the Dutch-Calvinist tradition.”).   
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that churches nevertheless easily qualify as First Amendment institutions because “they 
are surely well-established, self-governing institutions with a longstanding infrastructural 
role in public discourse and a unique set of contributions to make to it.”58 Here, Horwitz’s 
claim may prove too much. Some sectarian denominations do not have “a longstanding 
infrastructural role in public discourse.”59 Certain nondenominational churches and house 
churches are neither “well-established” nor “self-governing.”60 A church using LSD as its 
“blessed sacrament” surely offers a “unique set of contributions,” but one wonders if those 
contributions easily qualify it as a First Amendment institution.61  
More fundamentally, if First Amendment institutional prerequisites exist for 
churches apart from theological justifications, it is not clear what work the theological 
arguments are doing. Conversely, if the non-theological institutional prerequisites are 
really as generalized as Horwitz suggests, then it is not clear why one would draw the line 
at churches but not other private groups. Why, for example, is a therapy group or an artists’ 
collective differently situated than a church on the justification that Horwitz has offered? 
ASSOCIATIONS 
I have suggested above that Horwitz’s categories of churches and universities 
encounter significant definitional challenges. The more we push at the boundaries by 
introducing examples with “family resemblances,” the less clear the initial justifications 
for the distinctive categories become. That tension is even more acute when we turn to the 
chapter of First Amendment Institutions that most overlaps with my own scholarship: 
associations.62 Horwitz characterizes associations as “where people and ideas meet.”63 But 
that description is also true of churches and universities. And here we begin to see one of 
the problems with imposing institutional categories: most institutions are sufficiently 
multifaceted that they are doing different things at different times (or many things at the 
same time). Consider, for example, a religious university, which can be a university 
(“where ideas begin”), a religious organization (“where souls are saved”), and an 
association (“where people and ideas meet”).64 How are we to sort the relevant First 
Amendment doctrine for such an institution? 
Horwitz’s chapter on associations also complicates his theory by shifting away from 
                                                          
 58. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 176 (“Those who resist the religious overtones implicit in calling the church 
a ‘sovereign sphere’ may translate those terms easily enough into the less exalted language of First Amendment 
institutionalism.”).   
 59. It also unclear whether or why the “public discourse” justification should be a primary argument for the 
institutional protections offered to churches. It does not underlie the free exercise clause. See, e.g., Michael W. 
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1139 (1990) (noting 
that religious freedom embodies “counterassimilationist” ideals that allow people “of different religious faiths to 
maintain their differences in the face of powerful pressures to conform”). 
 60. See, e.g., ‘House Churches’ Keep Worship Small, Simple, Friendly, USA TODAY (July 22, 2010, 1:20 
PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/religion/2010-07-22-housechurch21_ST_N.htm (“House church[es] 
. . . have no clergy and everyone is expected to contribute to the teaching, singing and praying . . . ‘The only 
consistent thing about house church is that each one is different.’”). 
 61. See United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 448 (D. D.C. 1968) (rejecting a religious exemption claim 
for LSD and marijuana use). 
 62. See, e.g., JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY (2012).   
 63. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 211. 
 64. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Whom Should a Catholic University Honor?: “Speaking” with Integrity, 
49 J. CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES 233 (2010) (describing multiple purposes of a Catholic university). 
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the public discourse justification that underlies his other institutional categories. Recall 
that Horwitz believes “the core of First Amendment institutionalism is that an institution 
serves a well-established function that forms part of the infrastructure of public discourse 
and that it operates as a substantially self-regulating institution.”65 But when he turns his 
gaze to associations, Horwitz largely abandons the public discourse justification and 
focuses instead on “social relationships” that “can be central to the formation of our 
identities.”66 In fact, “[a]ssociations are vital to the formation of individual citizens 
regardless of whether they engage in expressive activity toward the public” and “it is less 
important that associations convey a particular message to others than that they serve as a 
source of meaning to their members.”67 Those justifications seem far afield from the public 
discourse justification. In fact, they could even impede or counteract public discourse by 
reinforcing what Cass Sunstein has called “enclave deliberation.”68 
By noting the shift in justification, I do not mean to suggest that Horwitz’s arguments 
for associations are unpersuasive or unimportant. To the contrary, I think he is right to 
press them quite apart from the public discourse justification.69 But these arguments apply 
with similar force to universities and churches, which suggests that they might also justify 
heightened protections for those institutions. And if those justifications are sufficient, then 
why or, to what extent, do we care about the public discourse justification for those other 
institutions? 
The twofold shift in the chapter of associations—the move away from the “public 
discourse” function and the blurring of the line between “associations” and other 
institutions like universities and churches—gestures toward what I think is the real force 
behind Horwitz’s argument: “associational autonomy, not associational expression.”70 In 
an earlier review of Horwitz’s book, Professor Randy Kozel characterized this argument 
as “structural institutionalism.”71 As Kozel notes, in its “most aggressive form,” Horwitz’s 
institutionalism “seeks to deploy nonpolitical institutions as counterweights against 
governmental authority.”72 This reframing of Horwitz’s argument brings it in line with a 
strand of recent First Amendment scholarship that examines constitutional protections for 
groups apart from an instrumental “expressive” purpose.73 
                                                          
 65. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 120. Universities must make “a uniquely academic contribution to public 
discourse.” Id. at 121.   
 66. Id. at 221 (“Associations are important to our infrastructure of public discourse, but they are not important 
simply because they involve public discourse . . . . Associations matter as much as for the fact of belonging to 
them as they do for whatever messages they happen to express.”). Horwitz at times suggests that associations 
“form a fundamental part of the infrastructure of public discourse” and “are sources of values . . . both challenging 
and refreshing the state and public discourse.” Id. at 222. For Horwitz, “[t]his meaning-creating capacity serves 
a vital infrastructural role in public discourse.” Id. at 228. But these public discourse characterizations are outliers 
in the chapter on associations. And they suggest more of an instrumental or structural role for public discourse, 
which could be attributable to almost any institution (not just First Amendment institutions).  
 67. Id. at 221-22 (emphasis in original). 
 68. CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 76 (2007). 
 69. See, e.g., INAZU, supra note 62, at 156-62. 
 70. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 225. 
 71. Randy J. Kozel, Institutional Autonomy and Constitutional Structure, 112 MICH. L. REV. 957, 958 (2014). 
 72. Id. at 970. Kozel writes that the Constitution “grants autonomy to First Amendment institutions as vital 
safe havens from the threat of governmental overreaching.” Id. at 964. He also observes that Horwitz “says 
relatively little about institutionalism’s constitutional foundations.” Id. at 971. 
 73. See, e.g., INAZU, supra note 62; Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, Assembly Resurrected, 91 TEXAS L. REV. 351 
(2012); Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978 (2011); Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Changing 
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I find Kozel’s interpretation the most helpful way to understand Horwitz’s 
theoretical approach to institutions. But Kozel’s reading points toward both a broadening 
and flattening of Horwitz’s institutional categories: it is difficult to confine structural 
institutionalism to a particular subset of non-state institutions. Consider, for example, an 
observation that I have made in other contexts: one of the reasons that we care about 
associations in our constitutional landscape is that they protect the informal and inchoate 
relationships out of which public discourse emerges.74 Potato sack races and pageants 
forged relationships in the early suffragist movement.75 Dinners and parties coalesced into 
the Harlem Renaissance.76 Gay bars and informal networks led to Stonewall.77 Without 
extending protections to these less defined groups, the lens of an institutional approach 
becomes fundamentally conservative, resisting innovation and new forms of collective 
action. Horwitz’s privileging of “self-regulated,” “relatively stable,” and “established” 
institutions may inadvertently reinforce this conservatism.78 
CONTEXT IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
If the preceding commentary seems overly negative or deconstructive, I do not mean 
it to be so. Horwitz is on to something important with his institutional and contextual focus. 
But the significance of his contribution is obscured by the blurring of his categories and 
justifications. While this blurring is to some extent unavoidable, Horwitz unnecessarily 
complicates it with his discussion of the state action doctrine. In this final section, I want 
to suggest that rejecting Horwitz’s approach to state action strengthens the rest of his 
argument. 
In a book that registers dissatisfaction over the lack of context in First Amendment 
doctrine, it is not without irony that Horwitz dismisses one of the few existing contextual 
doctrines by taking aim at the state action doctrine.79 To be sure, Horwitz scores some 
commonsense and rhetorical points by suggesting that a private university like Harvard 
has more in common with a public university like Michigan than it does with a private 
non-university like Wal-Mart.80 But the state action distinction is still a fairly good proxy 
                                                          
the People: Legal Regulation and American Democracy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2011); Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The 
Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 543 (2009); John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 
84 TUL. L. REV. 565 (2010); Michael W. McConnell, Freedom by Association, FIRST THINGS 39, 41 (Aug./Sept. 
2012); Timothy Zick, Recovering the Assembly Clause, 91 TEXAS L. REV. 375 (2012).  
 74. John D. Inazu, Virtual Assembly, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1093, 1097-1102 (2013).  
 75. INAZU, supra note 62, at 44-45. 
 76. Id. at 47. 
 77. Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale: A Tripartite Approach, 
85 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1525–33 (2001).   
 78. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 15. Horwitz at one point refers to institutions that “might be thought of as 
‘emerging’ First Amendment institutions whose evolving culture and self-regulatory practices might one day 
merit a substantial amount of legal autonomy.” Id. at 22. He suggests that even prior to this grant of autonomy, 
these inchoate institutions “may well still merit strong legal protection.” Id. These are important concessions, but 
it isn’t clear how Horwitz reconciles them with the boundaries that he wants to draw around First Amendment 
institutions. For example, what “strong legal protections” would Horwitz provide to emerging First Amendment 
institutions, and how would he distinguish protection-worthy emerging institutions from “regular” emerging 
institutions that may not evolve into First Amendment institutions?  
 79. Id. at 100. 
 80. Id. at 17 (“First Amendment institutionalism argues that this distinction is often less important than the 
basic idea of thinking about institutions, public or private, in terms of their functions and roles in 
society. . .Sometimes a university is a university, no matter who signs the checks.”). Cf. id. at 102 (“Public 
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in other ways. 
The First Amendment has long been understood to be a restriction against 
government restrictions: “Congress shall make no law . . . .”81 Horwitz notes that courts 
and legislatures have at times blurred that line, most notably during the Civil Rights era 
and the push to end the hold of public and private segregation in the Jim Crow South.82 
Some scholars have argued for an even greater dissolution of the line.83 Horwitz offers a 
qualified endorsement of these latter arguments: “[i]n cases involving First Amendment 
institutions, it may be less important to ask whether a particular institution is public or 
private than to ask what the nature of that institution is and what role it plays in public 
discourse.”84 In some cases, “we might be better off thinking about the institutional nature 
of First Amendment institutions than about their nominally public or private status.”85 
Although I appreciate the normative concerns raised about the state action doctrine 
(and, in particular, the forms of coercive power that can be advanced by non-state actors),86 
I have never understood arguments to abandon the doctrine as a matter of constitutional 
law.87 One reason that the public-private distinction seems to work decently as an initial 
sorting mechanism is that we have structured many of our relationships around institutions 
that depend on it.88 There are no private military bases and there are very few public 
churches.89 
Similar aspects of public and private hold true in the context of Horwitz’s other 
institutional categories. For example, it seems plausible to me that the University of 
Alabama, Shelton State, and Air University are all state actors subject to the restrictions 
of the First Amendment in a way that Heritage Christian University is not. Horwitz argues 
that “[a]s First Amendment institutions, universities, consistent with their own sense of 
what their mission demands, should have the choice to be ‘politically correct’ or 
‘politically incorrect’—provided they do so as universities.”90 But almost nobody would 
want Air University to limit its students to men, even if it determined that its pedagogical 
mission would be better advanced with gender homogeneity. And most people would balk 
                                                          
broadcasters may have a different set of owners than private broadcasters. But the contribution they make to 
public discourse is the same, and they follow the same professional norms. If we must assign such an entity a 
“dominant characterization,” it may make more sense to treat it as a “journalist” than as a “state actor.”). 
 81. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 82. “Even under current doctrine, the public-private distinction is not a bright line. This is most obvious in 
the field of race relations.” HORWITZ, supra 1, at 101. 
 83. See, e.g., Gregory P. Magarian, The First Amendment, The Public-Private Distinction, and 
Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 144 (2004) (noting 
critiques against the public-private distinction); Nelson Tebbe, Associations and the Constitution: Four 
Questions About Four Freedoms, 92 N.C. L. REV. 917, 941 (2014) (same). 
 84. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 102 (emphasis in original). 
 85. Id. at 102 (emphasis in original). 
 86. See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989); Ruth Abbey, Back Toward 
a Comprehensive Liberalism? Justice as Fairness, Gender, and Families, 35 POL. THEORY 5 (2007). 
 87. For a defense of the state action doctrine, see Lillian BeVier & John Harrison, The State Action Principle 
and Its Critics, 96 VA. L. REV. 1767 (2010).   
 88. Cf. Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between Public and Private, Non-Profit 
and Profit, and Secular and Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061, 1081 (2000) (“Commitment to some form of 
distinction between the public and private realm is also vital to a vibrant pluralist society.”).   
 89. To be sure, each of these institutions has some blending of influences, but the categories of public and 
private work pretty well in these instances. 
 90. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 237 (emphasis in original). 
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at the University of Alabama requiring every class to start with a prayer to God to 
consecrate the activities of teaching and learning, even if the administration concluded that 
divine petitions would be pedagogically useful. Conversely, while some people would be 
concerned if Heritage Christian University adopted either of these practices, many people 
would recognize that its private status renders these kinds of decisions sufficiently 
autonomous. Indeed, the autonomy granted to Heritage Christian to pursue these practices 
as pedagogically justified practices is one way that Horwitz’s institutional arguments take 
shape. 
On the other hand, we may have good reason to adopt a contextual approach for 
public actors subject to the First Amendment. We can think of these contextual differences 
on at least three levels, which can be illustrated by returning to the university example. 
First, the government employees who run a public university are different than the 
government employees who staff a courthouse or fly military airplanes or guard prisons. 
Second, within the institutional category of public university, it may be that we want more 
or less latitude under the First Amendment at the University of Alabama (a state institution 
that serves a diverse constituency) than we do at Air University (a federal institution 
focused narrowly on the Air Force and related military endeavors).91 Finally, as Horwitz 
suggests, within each discrete example of each institution, we might distinguish between 
certain functions and certain actors who engage in those functions. 
CONCLUSION 
First Amendment Institutions gives us important theoretical and doctrinal tools to 
begin to think about the unique benefits and burdens of the groups, organizations, and 
institutions that we form. But the First Amendment implications of those entities are better 
understood within the public and private ordering of our society. In other words, they are 
better understood in context. 
 
                                                          
 91. Line-drawing within educational facilities also raises ambiguities over who decides which personnel 
advance the “academic contribution to the public discourse.” HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 237. Justice Thomas has 
expressed similar concerns about classifying “ministers” under the ministerial exception recognized in Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 711 (2012) (Thomas, J., concurring): 
Judicial attempts to fashion a civil definition of ‘minister’ through a bright-line test or 
multi-factor analysis risk disadvantaging those religious groups whose beliefs, practices, 
and membership are outside of the ‘mainstream’ or unpalatable to some. Moreover, 
uncertainty about whether its ministerial designation will be rejected, and a corresponding 
fear of liability, may cause a religious group to conform its beliefs and practices regarding 
‘ministers’ to the prevailing secular understanding.  
Id. (citing Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336 
(1987)). 
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